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Abstract 
There is ongoing debate about the effect of ownership on hospital performance as regards 
efficiency and care quality. This paper proposes an analysis of the differences in productivity and 
efficiency between French public and private hospitals. In France, public and private hospitals do 
not only differ in their objectives. They are also subject to different rules as regards investments 
and human resources management. In addition, they were financed according to different 
payment schemes until 2004: a global budget system was used for public hospitals, while private 
hospitals were paid on a fee-for-service basis.  
 
Since 2004, a prospective payment system (PPS) with fixed payment per stay in a given 
DRG is gradually introduced for both private and public hospitals. Payments generally differ for 
the same DRG, depending on whether the stay occurred in a private or public hospital. A 
convergence of payments between the nonprofit and for profit sectors was planned by 2018 by 
the previous government, but this project has been abandoned by the newly elected government. 
Pursuing such a convergence comes down to suppose that there are differences in efficiency 
between private and public hospitals, which would be reduced by the introduction of competition 
between these two sectors.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the productivity of public and private hospitals in 
France. We try to assess the respective impacts, on productivity differences, of differences in 
efficiency, patient characteristics and production composition. We have chosen to estimate a 
production function. For that purpose, we have defined a variable measuring the volume of care 
services provided by each hospital, synthetizing the hospital multiproduct activity into one 
homogenous output.  
 
Our data comes from two administrative sources which record exhaustive information about 
French hospitals. Matching these two database provides us an original source of information, at 
the hospital-year level, about both the production composition (number of stays in each DRG), 
and production factors (number of beds, facilities, number of doctors, nurses, of administrative 
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and support staff, etc.). We observe 1,604 hospitals over the period 1998-2003, of which 642 
hospitals are public, 126 are private not-for-profit and 836 are private-for-profit. This database is 
relative to acute care and covers more than 95 % of French hospitals.  
 
We use a stochastic production frontier approach combined with hospitals fixed effects. We find 
that the lower productivity of public hospitals is not explained by inefficiency (distance to the 
frontier), but oversized establishments, patient characteristics and production characteristics (small 
proportion of surgical stays). Once patient and production characteristics are taken into account, 
large and medium sized public hospitals appear to be more efficient than private hospitals. As a 
result, payment convergence would provide incentives for public hospitals to change the 
composition of their supply for care. 
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Résumé 
 
En France les cliniques privées jouent un rôle important dans l’offre de soins hospitaliers. En 2007, 
56 % des séjours ont eu lieu dans des hôpitaux publics, 8 % dans des hôpitaux privés à but non 
lucratifs, qui participent au service public hospitalier (PSPH) et 36 % dans des hôpitaux privés à but 
lucratif (cliniques). Plusieurs rapports administratifs ont récemment montré qu’un séjour dans un 
hôpital public ou PSPH était plus coûteux que dans une clinique privée, suggérant que la productivité 
du secteur public était relativement faible. Cet article a pour but de comprendre les différences de 
productivité observées en France entre les hôpitaux publics, les hôpitaux PSPH et les cliniques 
privées.  
L’introduction de la Tarification à l’Activité (T2A) en 2004 visait à améliorer l’efficacité de la dépense 
pour les soins hospitaliers. La mise en œuvre du nouveau paiement est progressive, avec une 
application intégrale à partir de 2008. Dès le départ, les tarifs différaient selon que le séjour avait lieu 
dans un hôpital public ou un hôpital privé à but lucratif. Actuellement, les paiements par séjour dans 
une pathologie donnée sont en moyenne 27 % plus élevés dans le secteur public que dans le secteur 
privé. Une convergence des grilles tarifaires des secteurs public (et PSPH) et privé était prévue à 
l’horizon 2018. Cet objectif a été abandonné par le gouvernement élu en 2012. Mettre en place cette 
convergence reviendrait à supposer que les différences de coûts sont exclusivement dues à des 
différences d’efficacité, qui seraient éliminées par l’introduction d’une concurrence entre les deux 
secteurs.  
Notre objectif est d’examiner s’il existe une influence de la composition des séjours sur la productivité 
des hôpitaux en matière de soins aigus. Si tel est le cas, introduire de la concurrence entre les 
établissements sur la base de la T2A crée de fortes pressions en faveur d’une réorganisation de l’offre 
de soins. Ces changements sont souhaitables s’ils permettent d’améliorer l’efficacité dans la 
délivrance des soins hospitaliers. En revanche, il n’est pas souhaitable que le système de tarification 
crée des incitations à la sélection de patients ou à l’arrêt de la production de soins qui seraient 
importants du point de vue du bien-être collectif.  
Les données utilisées proviennent de deux bases administratives: les données du PMSI et celles de la 
SAE. La base finale contient 1 604 hôpitaux sur la période 1998-2003, dont 642 sont publics, 126 sont 
PSPH et 836 sont privés. Pour les soins aigus cette base est proche de l’exhaustivité: en 2003, elle 
représente 90% de l’ensemble des séjours de soins aigus en France métropolitaine. L’analyse couvre 
les six années précédant l’introduction de la T2A en France afin d’observer précisément la situation 
qui préexistait avant la mise en place de nouvelles incitations. Ce travail permet d’avoir un référentiel 
sur la situation du tissu hospitalier français et les performances comparées des établissements 
publics, PSPH et privés, avant la mise en place de la réforme.   
 
En synthétisant l’activité “multiproduit” de l’hôpital par un produit homogène défini selon des critères 
identiques, quel que soit le statut de l’hôpital, nous montrons que le diagnostic sur l’efficacité 
productive des hôpitaux publics dépend de la définition de la frontière de production : lorsque l’on 
utilise une fonction de production classique mettant en relation les inputs et l’output, les scores 
d’efficacité des hôpitaux publics sont inférieurs à ceux des hôpitaux PSPH, eux-mêmes inférieurs à 
ceux des cliniques privées. Mais l’ordre des performances relatives s’inverse lorsque l’on tient compte 
des caractéristiques de la patientèle et la composition des séjours des hôpitaux : à l’exception des 
petits établissements, les hôpitaux publics et PSPH apparaissent alors plus efficaces que les cliniques 
privées.  
Ces résultats doivent être interprétés à la lumière des différences de cahiers des charges encadrant 
les activités des hôpitaux publics et privés. Il est frappant de constater que la prise en compte 
d’indicateurs concernant la structure de l’activité et la composition de la patientèle modifie 
radicalement le diagnostic sur l’efficacité productive des hôpitaux publics.  
La plus faible productivité des hôpitaux publics s’explique principalement par le nombre de lits, des 
personnels médico-techniques en sureffectifs, la composition de leur patientèle et celle de leurs 
séjours (caractérisée entre autres par une faible proportion de séjours chirurgicaux). Elle ne s’explique 
pas par une moindre efficacité des hôpitaux publics.  
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1 Introduction
The French hospital industry is one example of a market where public, private nonprofit
(NP) and private-for-profit (FP) hospitals co-exist in significant proportions: in 2007, 56
% of stays for acute care occured in public hospitals, 8 % in private nonprofit, and 36
% in for profit hospitals (Arnault et al., 2009). Recently, several administrative reports
have shown that in France public and private nonprofit hospitals are more costly than for
profit hospitals, for a stay in a given DRG, suggesting that productivity is rather low for
public and private nonprofit hospitals (Aballea et al., 2006; DHOS, 2009). Defenders of
public and nonprofit hospitals advocates that this productivity gap is not due to a lack of
effi ciency but related by their mandate. Indeed, these hospitals are not allowed to select
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for useful comments the participants of the Health Economics Workshop in PSE, of the Econometrics and
Microeconomic applications seminar in Paris 1 University, as well as the participants of the Workshop on
Health, inequalities, risk and public policy, Paris Descartes, 2009 and of the Irdes Workshop on Applied
Health Economics and Policy Evaluation, Paris, 2010, participants to the ECHE, Helsinki 2011 and to
the IHEA Congress, Toronto 2012. All remaining errors are ours. This study is funded in part by grants
from CEPREMAP and from the DREES (Direction de la Recherche, des Etudes, de l’Evaluation et des
Statistiques) of the French Ministry of Labor and Solidarity.We also gratefully acknowledge the support of
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patients and have to deliver care in relation to social welfare considerations, preventing
any specialization in some lucrative activity.
The purpose of this paper is to examine to which extent differences in the composition of
stays and patient characteristics might explain productivity differences that are observed in
France between public, private nonprofit (NP) and private-for-profit (FP) hospitals. Refer-
ing to the model of yardstick competition (Shleifer,1985), Prospective Payment Systems
(PPS) are based on the assumption that hospitals are identical. Any heterogeneity in cost
for a stay in a given DRG is supposed to derive from moral hazard, i.e. heterogeneity in cost
reduction efforts provided by hospitals’managers. Actually, there are many other sources
of cost heterogeneity, such as quality of care, patient characteristics, returns to scale, and
scope economies. Dealing with adverse selection due to hospital heterogeneity in designing
a PPS is an important issue on the research agenda (Ellis, 1998; Keeler, 1990; Laffont and
Tirole, 1993; Ma, 1994, 1998; Pope, 1990, Dormont and Milcent, 2005). However, most
of the litterature focuses on the reimbursement of a stay in a given DRG, without paying
attention to the potential influence of the composition of stays that form the whole hospital
activity.
In practice, Prospective Payment Systems lead to budgets that are linear in the number
of stays in each DRG. The implicit assumption underlying such a computation is that there
is no scale nor scope economies. Actually, some hospitals might receive an additional annual
budget for activities such as teaching, research, palliative care, geriatry, emergency care,
or for having a high proportion of low-income patients. But the payment for stays in acute
care is designed as if size and composition of activity had no influence on cost per stay. Is
it true? Or is this approximation illegitimate?
Our purpose is to evaluate the influence of the composition of stays on hospital pro-
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ductivity regarding acute care. If the stay composition has an influence on hospitals’
productivity, implementing a yardstick competition is likely to induce changes in the or-
ganization of the supply for hospital care. These changes might be mergers, closing1, own-
ership conversions, or simply changes in the structure of stays within hospitals, like an
increase in the proportion of surgical stays. On the one hand, these changes are desirable
when they lead to more effi ciency in care provision. On the other hand, it is not desirable
that hospitals are given incentives to select patients or to discontinue the provision of care
services that are important from a social welfare perspective. For the needs to be fullfilled,
many governments put mandates on public hospitals that are not shared by their for profit
counterparts. Should payments be adjusted for differences in the hospital production com-
position ? This issue is of major importance when a yardstick competition is implemented
between hospitals with different mandates.
In France, public, private nonprofit (NP) and private-for-profit (FP) hospitals differ not
only in their objectives. They are also subject to different mandates and to different rules
as regards human resources management. Since 2004, a prospective payment system with
fixed payment per stay in a given DRG has been gradually introduced for all hospitals.
However, two payment schedules are used, one for nonprofit hospitals (public and private),
one for private-for-profit hospitals. Currently, payments per stay in a given DRG are on
average 27 % higher in the nonprofit sector (public and private) than in the for profit sector
(DHOS, 2009).2
A convergence of payments between the nonprofit and for profit sectors was planned by
2018 by the previous government, but this project has been abandoned by the newly elected
1Numerous mergers, closing and ownership conversions have been observed in the US care system, citer
xyz.
2Actually, the level of the average payment difference depends on whether it is computed on the basis of
the casemix in the private for-profit (in which case it is equal to 21 %) or public/nonprofit sector (27 %).
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government. Pursuing such a convergence comes down to supposing that differences in cost
per stay are due to differences in effi ciency between nonprofit and for profit hospitals, which
would be reduced by the introduction of competition between these two sectors. Currently,
there is a strong lobbying from the for profit sector in favor of an acceleration of the process
towards payment convergence. Given the current gap in payments between nonprofit and
for profit hospitals, such a policy would generate sizeable rents for the for profit hospitals.3
On the one hand, these rents are justified since they derive from a payment scheme which
permits the revelation of the cost for an effi cient activity4. On the other hand, they are not
fully justified if the lower cost of private hospitals is partly due to the fact that their activity
is free of the constraints and mandates that affect public hospitals. Our purpose is to
question the relevance of the convergence objective by analysing the causes of productivity
differences that are observed between hospital types before the reform implementation.
More exactly, our purpose is to disentangle the impact of hospital ineffi ciency per se from
the impacts of the stay composition and patient characteristics.
Focusing on productivity, we can use a quasi-exhaustive information from an adminis-
trative file recording stays for acute care. The empirical analysis is performed on a panel
of 1,604 French hospitals observed over the year 1998 to 2003, of which 642 are public, 126
private nonprofit and 836 private-for-profit. For year 2003, this database represents more
than 13 millions of stays, covering about 90 % of total discharges for acute care.
We suppose the production function to be identical for all hospitals. Indeed, this as-
sumption underlies the introduction of a yardstick competition between hospitals of all
3 Indeed, in this case payments would be set in between the levels observed in the for profit and non
profit sectors.
4Otherwise, this cost level would remain a private information of the hospital’s manager (Laffont and
Tirole, 1993).
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types. We adopt a stochastic production frontier approach combined with hospitals fixed
effects in order to evaluate to what extent differences in productivity that are observed
between nonprofit hospitals (public and private) and for profit hospitals can be explained
by differences in patient and production characteristics. Moreover, we examine how the
assessment of effi ciency can be modified when we take the composition of stays into con-
sideration. Finally, we draw conclusions on the potential impact of payment convergence
between the nonprofit and for profit hospitals.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a quick overview about the
literature devoted to ownership and hospital performances. In Section 3, we describe the
French regulation of hospital care. A description of the data is provided in section 4. The
econometric specification and estimation strategy are explained in Section 5. Our results
are presented in Section 6, with an analysis of the components of productivity differences
between hospital types. Section 7 concludes.
2 Ownership and hospital performances
Numerous papers try to identify the impact of ownership structures in the hospital indus-
try. From a theoretical point of view, differences in performance should derive from the
differences in objectives under different ownership structures. In short, public hospitals
have little incentives to eliminate waste while nonprofit hospitals might expand the quan-
tity and quality of services provided beyond the socially optimal level (Newhouse,1970,
Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006). For profit hospitals are likely to be the most effi cient:
they maximize profit and can lower noncontractible quality to maximize return (Hart et
al., 1997). Differences in performances among ownership types are likely to be diminished
if a payment system based on yardstick competition is implemented.
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The empirical litterature investigates the impact of ownership on hospital performance
in two ways. Some studies examine the impact of ownership on effi ciency, while other
studies focus on possible supply induced demand behavior and changes in care quality
associated to ownership. (i) As concerns effi ciency, empirical evidence is not very conclu-
sive. According to Sloan (2000), there is no systematic difference between for profit and
nonprofit hospitals. Burgess and Wilson (1996) underline that ineffi ciency has several di-
mensions, being reflected in radial, slack or scale ineffi ciency. No kind of hospital ownership
appears to be more effi cient in every dimension. They find that hospitals of the Veteran
Administration are more effi cient than FP and NP hospitals in terms of radial effi ciency,
but are highly ineffi cient as concerns scale. (ii) Other empirical studies examine whether
hospital ownership influences treatment costs and quality, for patients admitted for a given
illness. If hospitals are paid on a fee-for-services basis, FP hospitals have an incentive to
perform more numerous and intensive procedures. It is also the case under a PPS, when
a more intensive treatment results in a DRG with more weight. Sloan et al. (2001) show
that payments on behalf of Medicare patients admitted to for profit hospitals following a
stroke, a hip fracture, or a congestive heart failure, were higher than those admitted to
other hospitals. These findings are consistent with other results concerning hospitals of the
US care system. On the other hand, Lien et al. (2008) do not find significant differences
in treatment expenditures for stroke or heart cardiac between NP and FP hospitals in
Taiwan. Turning to the impact of ownership on quality, empirical results show that FP
status (or conversion to FP) is connected to a lower care quality (Picone et al., 2002; Lien
et al., 2008).
In our study, we are interested in issues of type (i), i.e. productivity and technical
effi ciency. We do not investigate a possible increase in expenditures due to more intensive
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procedures for a stay in a given DRG. We consider data at the hospital level and examine
productivity and technical effi ciency, taking as given the observed number of stays in each
DRG.
3 The French regulation of hospital care
In France, all hospitals are financed by a unique third-party payer, the French National
Health Insurance (NHI). The patient can freely choose between public, private NP or FP
hospital. In practice, he is referred to the hospital by the specialist who recommanded the
hospitalization. Choosing a private-for-profit hospital gives access to better confort and
reduces waiting time. There is no evidence of difference in care quality between public, non
profit and for profit hospitals. Choosing a private-for-profit hospital has implications on
the patient’s out-of-pocket expenditures: there are in general extra fees for accomodation
and extra payments to the doctor and possibly the anaesthetist. These extra fees are not
covered by the NHI, but may be covered by the patient’s complementary health insurance5.
However, most complementary insurance contracts do not cover overbillings (HCAAM,
2009).
In France, public, private nonprofit and for profit hospitals are subject to different rules
as regards investments, human resources management and patient selection.
In the public sector the number of beds is defined by an administrative authority,
and investment is controlled through financement. Doctors, nurses and other employees
are civil servants, which prevents any dismissal or transfer and hampers reorganizations.
5Currently, more than 90 % French people are covered by a private complementary health insurance,
which is provided by the employer, or subscribed on a voluntary basis. These insurances are subscribed in
addition to the NHI. Complementary health insurances have covered 13.7 % of total health care expenditures
in 2008 .
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Owing to their mandates, public hospitals cannot select patients and are assigned to supply
a comprehensive range of hospital care services. Finally, they must be open continously:
access to care must be garanteed for all, twenty-four hours a day. The characteristics of
large public hospitals in France are close to the characteristics of large nonprofit hospitals in
the U.S. They account for the majority of admissions, a medical career in public hospitals
is rather prestigious, all teaching hospitals are public, and large public hospitals generally
provide a high quality of care. In France, small public hospitals are not necessarily rural:
there are in general located in small provincial cities. Maintaining acute care activities for
small public hospitals is currently under debate: it could be better for social welfare to
convert them to nursing homes dedicated to rehabilitation or long term care. Actually,
geography does not matter much in France, which is not a very large country and has a
reliable transportation network. Each of the 22 administrative areas (Régions) is endowed
with a large teaching hospital that supplies all kind of acute care services and performs
innovative procedures. In case of need, every citizen can be rapidely admitted in such a
regional center, or in another large public hospital.
Private nonprofit hospitals are not numerous. They are subject to the same constraints
than public hospitals, except that their doctors, nurses, administrative staff and employees
are not civil servants. This allows for more flexibility in human resources management: in
addition to easier dismissals or transfers, they are not obliged to follow the remuneration
scale of the public service and can offer more generous payments to doctors.
French private-for-profit hospitals have a sizeable contribution to hospital care services:
about one third of discharges in acute care occurs in for profit hospitals. One observes a
growing specialization towards short stays (< 24 h) and surgical stays : currently half of
surgical stays take place in private-for-profit hospitals. They are subject to some adminis-
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trative constraints: their number of beds is defined by a planification at the regional level
and investments in hightech facilities are subject to an authorization. In practice, their
bargaining power is non negligible. Doctors salaried in the public sector are allowed, for a
limited amount of time per week, to work in a private hospital. They are self-employed for
this part of their activity. Above all, FP hospitals have no mandate specifying their supply
for care: they can specialize as they want and are allowed to select their patients. Given the
existence of a unique third party payer, cost-shifting is not an issue for French hospitals.
Patient selection is not mainly based on patients’income and socio-economic characteris-
tics. Richer patients might indeed have a more generous complementary insurance that
permit to raise overbilling. But the bulk of the bill is paid by the NHI, irrespective of
patient’s income level. On the other hand, FP hospitals have interest to select patients
that need intensive care, but are in a relatively good shape (not too old, with little or no
secundary diagnoses), in order to maximize their revenues, together with ensuring good
outcomes and a low complication rate. On the whole, private FP hospital decisions are
mostly influenced by the demand function they face and by conditions prevailing on the
market for health care.
In France, for profit hospital were originally owned and operated by one physician or
a group of physicians. Now this physician generation is coming to retirement age and in
the process of selling these establishments to investor-owned companies seeking corporate
profits. Large chains of hospitals are set up, such as Générale de Santé and Vitalia (partly
owned by the investment bank Blackstone). There is no doubt that substantial financial
returns are expected from such investments.
Why would public and NP hospitals be less effi cient than FP hospitals? As stated
above, these hospitals have different objectives and mandates and are subject to different
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rules relative to human resources management and patient selection. Moreover, they were
financed according to different payment schemes until 2003: a global budget system was
used for nonprofit hospitals (public and private), while private-for-profit hospitals were
paid a mix of fee-for-service and payments per day covering accomodation.
It is not obvious that these payment schemes should entail a higher effi ciency for private
FP hospitals. Indeed, their payment was equivalent to a retrospective payment per stay,
which does not provide incentives for effi ciency. As concerns public and private nonprofit
hospitals, the global budget system has been implemented with a soft budget constraint,
which makes the global budget ressemble to a retrospective payment. In other words,
payments implemented before 2004 did not give hospitals of any type much incentive for
effi ciency.
Since 2004, a prospective payment system (PPS) with fixed payment per stay in a
given DRG is gradually introduced for both private and public hospitals. In addition to
prospective payments per stay, hospitals can receive lump-sum payments to compensate
for activities such as teaching, research, emergency care, preventive care, etc. (Or, 2009).
Almost all of these lump-sum payments are granted to public hospitals. As stated above,
two different payment schedules are currently used for the prospective payment per stay,
one for private-for-profit hospitals, another one for nonprofit hospitals (public or private).
This payment scheme introduces two separate arenas of yardstick competition: between
for profit hospitals on the one hand, and between nonprofit hospitals, on the other hand.
Thus, it provides incentives for effi ciency for both hospital types. Nevertheless, owing to
the lump-sum payments received by public hospitals, and to the difference in payment
schedules used for the PPS, the power of incentives is probably not the same, depending
on the hospital type.
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In this paper, we compare the productivity and effi ciency of French public, private
nonprofit and for profit hospitals during period 1998-2003, i.e. before the reform that has
introduced a PPS. Hence, it will be possible for us to interpret differences in performances
over this period as deriving mainly from differences in mandates and objectives linked to
ownership.
4 The data
A vast majority of papers devoted to hospital effi ciency focuses on the estimation of a cost
function (see, for instance, Wagstaff, 1989, Linna, 1998, Rosko, 2001, Zuckerman et al.,
1994, Farsi et al., 2005). Costs functions allow to deal with the multiproduct activity of
hospitals and to check for ray economies of scale, product-specific economies of scale, and
economies of scope. Despite these advantages, we decided to focus on productivity and to
consider a production function. Our motivation is that we aim at performing a relevant
comparison of performances between hospital types. As a matter of fact, costs are generally
diffi cult to observe in the for profit sector. For competitive reasons, information about cost
is a rather sensitive information. Moreover, doctors might be part owners of for profit
hospitals, which add diffi culties to measure real costs and profitability. In addition, in
France the cost measure is not comparable between public and private hospitals: it does
not encompass the doctors’payments, nor overbilling in private nonprofit and for profit
hospitals, while in public hospitals doctors are salaried and their wages included in the
cost.
Taking advantage of the duality theory, we know that differences in costs between
hospital ownership can result from differences in technical effi ciency (distance to the frontier
defined by the production function), differences in input prices (payments to care providers
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and wages differ in the private and public sectors), and in input allocation. Estimating a
production function enables us to evaluate differences in technical effi ciency, and to identify
the sources of productivity differences. However, we will not be able to examine the impact
on costs of differences in input prices, and to check for possible allocative ineffi ciency.
4.1 Definition of production
The French classification system was inspired by the classification used in USA by the
Health Care Financing Administration. In France, a complete information system that
classifies inpatient stays by DRG has been set up since 1994 for non profit hospitals (public
and private) and 1997 for private-for-profit hospitals. Denote Njht the number of stays
in hospital h in year t that have been classified in DRG j. The French administrative
authority estimates the average cost per stay in a given DRG from a sample of hospitals
which participate in the cost database program on a voluntary basis. These average costs
are used to build the "Echelle Nationale des Coûts", a costweight scale which is updated
every year. This scale is based on relative costs and gives, for each stay in a given DRG j,
the corresponding number of production units, called ISA points6.
Denote pjt the number of ISA points attributed in year t for a stay in DRG j. It provides
a measure of the volume of corresponding care services. Hence, we define the production
of hospital j in year t by:
Qht =
J∑
j=1
pjt Njht (1)
This definition synthetizes the multiproduct hospital activity by one homogenous prod-
uct, measured in ISA points. To ensure the relevance of our comparison, we use the same
"price" scale pjt , j = 1, ..., J ; t = 1, ..., T , for hospitals of any type of ownership. For the
6 ISA stands for "Indice synthétique d’activité", i.e. Synthetic index of activity.
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period covered by our data (1998-2003), only the cost database relative to public and NP
hospitals is available7. Notice that we focus on the activity relative to acute-care only. As
stated above, the PPS concerns the payment of acute-care stays, and does not influence
directly the financing of other activities such as teaching or research. Our purpose is to
examine whether productivity relative to acute-care is influenced by the stays composition,
patient structure and teaching activity.
4.2 Two administrative databasis
Our data stem from two administrative sources: the PMSI and SAE databasis. PMSI
stands for Programme de Médicalisation des Systèmes d’Informations, which collects in-
formation about hospital activity regarding stays for acute care in all French hospitals.
The information is almost exhaustive: participation to PMSI is mandatory, except for
very small public hospitals with a specific status (hôpitaux locaux ). In PMSI database,
information is recorded at the stay level about DRG, secondary diagnoses, procedures im-
plemented, severity, mode of entry into the hospital (coming from home or transferred from
another hospital), mode of discharge (return home, transfer or death), length of stay, age,
and gender of the inpatient.
The SAE 8 database provides information at the hospital-year level about production
factors, i.e. number of acute-care hospital beds, facilities, number of doctors, nurses,
nursing auxiliairy staff, administrative staff and support staff (all are measured in full-time
equivalents).
Matching these two database provides information at the hospital-year level, about
the composition of hospital activity and its production factors. We eliminated hospitals
7A "Echelle Nationale des Coûts" for the private sector has been set up only from year 2004 on.
8SAE stands for Statistique Annuelle des Etablissements.
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for which the identification code was not recorded, preventing any match with the SAE
database. We also eliminated hospitals with no bed or no employees: these are small
establishments devoted exclusively to chemotherapy, radiotherapy or dialysis sessions.
Our final database contains 1,604 hospitals over the period 1998-2003, that is 7,731
observations at the hospital-stay level. This panel is unbalanced: not all hospitals are
observed from year 1998 to year 2003. For year 2003, this database represents about 90 %
of total discharges for acute-care.
We consider six production factors: the number of acute-care beds, denoted bed, the
number of physicians, denoted phys, the number of nurses, nurs, auxiliary nursing staff,
nurs_aux, administrative staff, adm, and support staff , supp.
The number of physicians is not consistently measured across hospital types: it is well
recorded for public hospitals, where doctors are salaried, but measured with errors for
nearly all for profit and private nonprofit hospitals. Indeed, when self-employed physicians
associated with private hospitals are recorded in the SAE database, there is no informa-
tion about their work time, so we cannot calculate full-time equivalents. Moreover, the
number of physicians is not recorded at all for 435 FP or NP hospitals. In order to treat
equally hospitals of all types, we decided to specify the number of physicians as an omitted
variable.9 As a result, the number of physicians is a component of the hospital specific
unobserved heterogeneity in our econometric specification. This component being likely to
be correlated with other regressors, we have considered a model with hospital fixed effects
to avoid possible bias.
9The same empirical strategy has been followed by Burgess and Wilson (1996).
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4.3 Characteristics of public, private nonprofit and for profit hospitals
Graphs 1 to 3 and table 1 display the main features of the data. 1,604 hospitals are observed,
of which 642 hospitals are public, 126 are private nonprofit (NP) and 836 are private-for-
profit (FP). For the purpose of the analysis, we have considered three size groups: small
hospitals, with less than 5,000 discharges per year, large hospitals with more than 10,000
discharges per year, and medium hospitals in between.
[Insert graphs 1 to 3 and table 1 about here]
On the whole, 62.9 % of discharges occurred in public hospitals, 4.6 % in private non-
profit hospitals, and 32.5 % in for profit hospitals. Graph 1 shows that the bulk of hospital
care services, measured by production indicator (1) comes from large public hospitals, while
for profit hospitals of any size have a smaller contribution to care services. Measuring pro-
ductivity by the annual number of ISA points per bed, we find that public hospitals of
any size are less productive than private nonprofit and for profit hospitals (table 1 and
graph 2). One observes also an amazing proportion of surgical stays, close to 50 % in for
profit hospitals of any size (graph 3). Table 1 displays more detailed information about
hospital characteristics. Small for profit hospitals appear to be quite numerous with an
average number of beds slightly higher than in small public hospitals (58 versus 45). for
profit medium sized hospitals are also twice more numerous (234 establishments) than their
public counterparts (117 establishments), but with less beds on average (118 versus 151).
Large hospitals are mainly public: there are 243 large public hospitals, for only 14 large
nonprofit and 61 large for profit hospitals. Large public hospitals ensure 53.4 % of hospital
care services. They are enormous, with 566 beds on average, to compare with the 201 beds
of their for profit counterparts. In addition to a relatively low proportion of surgical stays,
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public hospital activity is characterized by longer stays. This is particularly striking for
small public hospitals, with an average length of stay (LOS) equal to 9.3 days (3.8 days
in small for profit hospitals). This difference is still observable as concerns medium-sized
and large hospitals: LOS are on average 1.5 to 2 days longer in public hospitals than in
private-for-profit hospitals, nonprofit hospitals staying in between (about one day longer
than in for profit hospitals).
Table 2 displays information about the level of inputs and the organization of hospital
staff. On average, there are about 3 employees per bed , with large differences depending on
hospital size and ownership. Public hospitals employ more persons per bed than for profit
hospitals: 7.6 for small public hospitals and 3.7 for medium and large public hospitals,
while for profit hospitals of any size employ only 1.7 to 1.9 persons per bed. This result
holds for each component of hospital staff: public hospitals have more nurses, more nursing
auxiliaries, more administrative staffand more support staffper bed, than private-for-profit
hospitals. The contrast is particularly pronounced as concerns the number of nursing
auxiliaries per bed, which is more than six times higher in small public hospitals than in
small for profit hospitals. The number of support staff per bed is also very high in public
hospitals of any size.10 As for LOS, the characteristics of private nonprofit hospitals as
regards the number of employees per bed stay in between characteristics of public and for
profit hospitals.
10Table 2 displays also statistics on doctors per bed, computed on a sub-sample of 1,169 hospitals for
which the number of doctors is recorded. For private hospitals, we have no information on the work duration
of part-time physicians. We considered three alternative assumptions to build a full-time equivalent measure
of the number of doctors: half-time, 10 % or 80 % time. We obtain average numbers of doctors per bed that
do not appear to be different between hospital ownership. However, it is diffi cult to draw any conclusion
from this result, given the uncertainty about the relevance of our hypotheses. In addition, many self-
employed doctors are likely to be not recorded. As stated above, the number of doctors will be treated as
an omitted variable in our econometric estimations.
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To sum up, public and nonprofit hospitals employ more persons per bed and have longer
stays than for profit hospitals, suggesting a less effi cient use of inputs. It might also derive
from characteristics of their activity, such as the fact that they ensure a high proportion
of medical stays.
5 Econometric specification and estimation
We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function with 6 production factors : bed, phys,
nurs, nurs_aux, adm and supp. One has :
Qht = A (physht)
α1(nursht)
α2(nurs_auxht)
α3(admht)
α4(suppht)
α5(bedht)
β (2)
Taking the logarithms, one obtains the linear expression:
qht − bht = (µ− 1) bht + α1 [log(phys)ht − bht] + α2 [log(nurs)ht − bht] (3)
+α3 [log(nurs_aux)ht − bht] + α4 [log(adm)ht − bht] + α5 [log(supp)ht − bht] + a
with bht = Log(bedht) and qht = Log(Qht). a is a constant term and µ is the return to
scale parameter. As stated above, we prefer to treat the number of doctors as an omitted
variable: it is often not recorded and, when recorded, likely to be measured with errors.
In the econometric specification we formalize hospital unobserved heterogeneity and
ineffi ciency as follows:
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qht − bht = (µ− 1) bht + α2 [log(nurs)ht − bht] + α3 [log(nurs_aux)ht − bht] (4)
+α4 [log(adm)ht − bht] + α5 [log(supp)ht − bht]
+ct + γ + δ.teachh + vh − uh + ξht.
γ is an intercept, ct is a year fixed effect, teachh is a dummy variable indicating whether
h is a teaching hospital. vh is a random variable measuring unobserved heterogeneity at
hospital level and uh ≥ 0 is a non-negative random variable measuring hospital ineffi ciency.
ξht is a statitical noise supposed to be i.i.d. (0, σ
2
ξ) and uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables.
We use a two-stage approach: we first apply the OLS to estimate the following specifi-
cation:
qht − bht = (µ− 1) bht + α2 [log(nurs)ht − bht] + α3 [log(nurs_aux)ht − bht] (5)
+α4 [log(adm)ht − bht] + α5 [log(supp)ht − bht] + ct + ηh + ξht ,
where ηh is a hospital fixed effect.
In the second step, we use a stochastic production frontier approach (Aigner et al,
1977, Jondrow et al., 1982) to decompose the estimated hospital fixed effects into separate
estimates of hospital specific unobserved heterogeneity vh, and hospital ineffi ciency uh.
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More exactly one has, from11 (4) :
η̂h = γ + δ.teachh + vh − uh (6)
We assume that uh has a strictly non-negative distribution and that vh has a symet-
ric distribution and apply the maximum likelihood estimator to (6). If one assumes that
vh ∼ N(0, σ2v) and uh ∼ N+(0, σ2u), the model is normal-half normal. Another possibil-
ity is to assume that uh follows the exponential distribution, in which case the model is
normal-exponential. The difference between the log of output qh and its maximal value
qmaxh given by the frontier is measured by − uh. The estimation makes it possible to com-
pute the asymmetry parameter λ =
σu
σv
, which gives an evaluation of the magnitude of
the ineffi ciency component. In addition, we can compute an effi ciency rate at the hospital
level:
effih = exp {−uh} =
Qh
Qmaxh
(7)
Our empirical strategy consists in considering three specifications. Our first specification
is defined in (5). It is a classical production function connecting inputs and output:
qht − bht = x′ht α+ ct + ηh + ξht , (Model 1)
where x′ht is a [1,5] vector describing production factors, i.e. the inputs.
We also consider two other specifications:
qht − bht = x′ht α+ z′ht β + c′t + η′h + ξ′ht (Model 2)
11Here we do not add dummies relative to ownership on purpose, in order to examine in the following
how effi ciency rate distributions might vary accross hosiptal sizes and ownerships.
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qht − bht = x′ht α+ z′ht β + π′htθ + c′′t + η′′h + ξ′′ht (Model 3)
In model (Model 2) we add a [1,19] vector z′ht describing patient characteristics: pro-
portion of patients of given age and gender, severity, entry and discharge mode. In model
(Model 3) we add a [1,13] vector π′ht describing production characteristics: proportion
of stays in 10 important MDC (Major Diagnostic Categories: neurology (MDC1), ophtal-
mology (MDC2), otorhinolaryngology (MDC3), pneumology (MDC4), cardiology (MDC5),
gastroenterology (MDC6), orthopaedics (MDC8), deliveries (MDC14), short stays (shorter
than 24 hours and coded12 MDC24), degree of specialization, proportion of surgical stays.
These specifications are rather “eclectic”(Vita, 1990) since variables describing heterogene-
ity in the output appear at the right hand side of the production function. We believe it
is relevant: the variability of the added regressors is mainly composed of between hospital
variability and we specify a fixed hospital effect for each equation
Our two-step estimation is rather particular. Most papers devoted to stochastic frontier
analysis use a one-step maximum likelihood estimator. For that purpose, it is assumed that
hospital specific heterogeneity vh and hospital ineffi ciency uh are both uncorrelated with
regressors. This assumption seems to us quite untenable: vh is linked to omitted variables
such as care quality, or the number of physicians, which are likely to be correlated with the
level of inputs. Estimating a fixed effect model allows us to obtain consistent estimations
of the production function parameters. Moreover, we assume that the first step estimates
of ηh are consistent. This is not obvious, but makes it possible to avoid assuming an
independency between regressors and random variables vh and uh.
12Coding short stays as MDC24 is specific to France.
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Another important issue is whether hospital specific heterogeneity should affect the
production function or the ineffi ciency component. Greene (2004) shows that within a
fixed effect approach, there is no satisfactory specification: either the fixed effect is en-
tirely absorbed in the ineffi ciency component, or it affects the production function only.
Ineffi ciency is either overestimated or underestimated. Many papers suppose that the inef-
ficiency term uh is random and uncorrelated with the regressors of the production function,
but formalize the idea that it is correlated to time and some covariates (Battese and Coelli,
1992,1995; Rosko, 2001, and Herr et al., 2010). But why are these covariates excluded from
the production function regressors? There is no clear-cut discussion on whether they might
explain production or ineffi ciency.
Consider variables z′ht : in model (Model 2) they are added to regressors x
′
ht to explain
hospital productivity qht − bht. Another specification could be adopted, which consists in
supposing that variables z′ht explain hospital ineffi ciency (Battese and Coelli, 1995). In the
first case these variables influence the frontier, in the second case they affect the distance
to the frontier.
Our purpose is to take public hospital mandates into account in the production function
specification. For instance, the fact that they are not allowed to select patients entails
specific values of z′ht , which reflect patient composition as regards age, gender and severity.
We want to evaluate to which extent the assessment of hospital effi ciency is influenced by
the frontier specification. Model (Model 1) is a classical production function. In model
(Model 2) we add patient characteristics to the frontier specification. In model (Model 3)
we add production composition. If model (Model 2) is the right specification, then model
(Model 1) is not consistently estimated if one supposes random effects uh and vh and if
variables z′ht , which are omitted in (Model 1) are correlated with regressors x
′
ht. Estimating
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a fixed effect model allow us to avoid these omitted variable bias.
The production function is supposed to be identical for all hospitals. Indeed, this as-
sumption underlies the introduction of a yardstick competition between hospitals of all
types. The robustness of the results with respect to the treatment of doctors as an omitted
variable is checked by carrying the estimations on a restricted sample where physicians
are observed (see appendix). We also show that our conclusions are not changed when we
consider a translog production function.
6 Results
The estimations of Model 1 and Model 3 are displayed in table 3.13
All models give similar results as concerns the influence of production factors on hos-
pital productivity (table 3). Every component of hospital staff has a positive marginal
productivity, except support staff, whose coeffi cient is negative. The positive impact of
nursing auxiliaries is weakly significant, and in Model 3 only.
The negative coeffi cients obtained for the number of beds suggest that the returns
to scale are decreasing (see expression (3)). However, such a conclusion is not relevant.
Indeed, the specification includes a constant specific to each hospital, which is likely to be
connected to its size. This result only means that locally, around the level corresponding
to its specific constant, a decrease in the number of beds induces an increase in hospital
productivity. This result does not tell anything about the optimal size of establishments,
that is, about the productivity levels of hospitals of different sizes.14
13We do not publish the results for Model 2, which are available on request. Indeed, this model gives
estimated coeffi cients for patient characteristicswhich are quite similar to those obtained with Model 3.
14The issue of optimal size is out of the scope of this study. However, we have estimated a production
function without hospital fixed effects, including a polynomial function of the number of beds in order to
examine the relation between size (measured by the bed number) and productivity. With a polynom of
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6.1 Productivity relies on uncomplicated stays with intensive procedures
The estimation of Model 3 makes it possible to examine the impact of patient characteristics
on hospital productivity, as well as the impact of production composition. The proportion
of patients aged more than 80 has a negative influence on productivity, which is significant
for women aged 81-90. Conversely, the proportion of women aged 61-70 has a positive
impact, as well as the proportion of young men (aged 19-40). The proportion of patients
of severity 2 or 3 has a positive impact on productivity. It is important to avoid any
misinterpretation of the meaning of this variable: compared to the reference (severity
degree equal to 1), severity degrees 2 or 3 do not indicate the presence of comorbidities
with complication risks. They only indicate that an intensive, or very intensive, surgical
procedure was performed. Finally, the estimations show that the proportion of patients
who died during their stay has a strong negative influence on hospital productivity.
These results show how the measure of hospital production works. As stated above, it
is based on a valuation of stays in different DRGs on the basis of the costweight scale (see
(1)). A stay contributes to an improvement in productivity if (i) it is associated to the
performance of a rather invasive procedure; (ii) it is "simple", i.e. it corresponds to a single
pathology in the DRG classification. Indeed, intensive procedures are well paid in terms of
ISA points, and a simple stay is shorter and uses less resources (for the same return in ISA
points) than a complicated stay with comorbidities. This is why stays of very old people
are unfavorable to productivity: old patients are generally affected by several illnesses or
complication factors, and their frailty impedes the use of invasive procedures. For the same
reason, stays with severity degrees equal to 2 or 3 greatly improve productivity, since they
degree 3, we have obtained a local minimum of productivity for a size equal to 8 beds, and a maximum for
a size equal to 253 beds.
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are associated to the performance of intensive procedures. Finally, a patient who dies in
hospital is the worst case: it is generally a very old person, with many comorbidities and
high complication risks. In this case, a large amount of resources is spent for a classification
in a single DRG.
Estimations displayed in the lower part of table 3 show the influence of the composition
of hospital activity on productivity. The proportion of surgical stays has a large positive
impact on productivity (a 0.1 increase in this proportion increases productivity by 9.7%).
The proportion of short stays (less than 24H) also has a large positive impact: a 0.1 increase
in the proportion of short stays raises productivity by 7.9%. The same mechanisms are at
work: surgical stays are well paid in ISA points and short stays use less resources. We also
find that some types of activity have a positive impact on productivity: this is the case for
stays in the MDC14 (Deliveries), MDC5 (Circulatory system), MDC6 (Digestive system),
MDC4 (Respiratory system) and MDC8 (Orthopaedics).
6.2 The diagnosis of effi ciency is contingent upon taking into account
patient and production characteristics
The results of the second step of the estimation are summarized in tables 4a and 4b. The
asymmetry parameter is reduced when we introduce patient characteristics in the definition
of the frontier (Model 2), and reduced further when production characteristics are added
to the specification (Model 3). This shows that the estimate of the ineffi ciency term partly
captures the influence of variables that are omitted in Model 1.
The estimation makes it possible to assess the difference uh between actual productivity
and the maximal level of productivity in case of full effi ciency. Hence, we can compute
effi ciency rates defined by (7): effih = exp {−uh} . This term is interpreted as follows:
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effih = 82.4 , for instance, means that the hospital has delivered a value of care services
equal to only 82.4 % of the amount it could have provided if it were fully effi cient. We
obtain an estimate of effih for each of the 1,604 hospitals of the sample. The distributions
and medians of the estimated effih are displayed in graphs 4 and 5, and in table 4b, by
hospital ownership and size.
The effi ciency rates derived from the estimation of Model 1 suggest that public hospi-
tals are less effi cient than private-for-profit hospitals, whatever their size (table 4b). The
difference is sizeable as concerns small hospitals: small public hospitals are amazingly
ineffi cient, with a median effi ciency rate equal to 17.2%! The gap between public and
private-for-profit hospitals is reduced for medium size hospitals: 64.2% versus 80.8%. And
it is even smaller for large hospitals, with still a higher effi ciency of private FP hospitals:
their median effi ciency rate is 88.7 % while it is 82.4 % for large public hospitals. Private
nonprofit hospitals of any size show intermediate effi ciency rates, but rather close to the
performance of for profit hospitals.
As stated above, our empirical strategy consists in examining how the assessment of
productive effi ciency is modified when regressors describing hospitals’patient and produc-
tion characteristics are included in the frontier specification. It is quite logical that the
introduction of additional regressors to the specification influences effi ciency assessment,
because it induces a shift in the frontier location. Yet, there is no mechanical reason for the
introduction of patient and production characteristics to work in favor of an improvement
of the public sector’s performance. We know, however, that private-for-profit hospitals
are free to select their patients and to choose the hospital services they want to supply.
It is likely that their choices as concerns patient selection and supply strategies aim at
improving effi ciency. If this argument is correct, we should obtain an improvement of pub-
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lic hospital performance when we introduce patient and production characteristics in the
frontier specification.
Indeed, the relative performance of public hospitals is clearly improved when we in-
troduce patient characteristics in the frontier specification (Model 2). The improvement
is accentuated when production characteristics are included. According to the results of
Model 3, the most effi cient hospitals are public hospitals, at least as concerns large and
medium sized establishments.15
Graph 4 and 5 display the distributions of the effi ciency rates estimated with Model 1
and Model 3. They show that large and medium sized public hospitals appear to be the
most effi cient when patient and production characteristics are taken into account, while
they appear to be the least effi cient when patient and production characteristics are taken
into account.
We have checked the robustness of this result by estimating a Translog production
function, and by eliminating teaching hospitals from the sample. We have also estimated
the model on a restricted sample of 1,169 hospitals where the number of physicians is
observed (in this case, physicians are not treated as an omitted variable). We have also
checked the results obtained when very small local or "hybrid" hospitals16 are eliminated.
In any case, we find that public hospitals are more effi cient than private-for-profit hospitals
when effi ciency rates are estimated with Model 3, while the reverse is true when they are
estimated with Model 1.17
15The performance of small public hospitals, though higher than in Model 1, is still very poor. Their
median effi ciency rate is 48.2 % with Model 3.
16These hospitals have a non negligible proportion of very long stays, which suggests that they provide
long term care in addition to acute care.
17Tables 7 and 8a, b in the appendix provide the results obtained when teaching hospitals are removed
from the sample.
26
6.3 The sources of productivity differences between public and private
hospitals
The estimation of the production function makes it possible to evaluate the components
of productivity differences between hospitals, depending on their ownership. The use of
a Cobb-Douglas specification has the advantage of leading to a formula with additive
contributions of inputs, patient and production characteristics.18 With three types of
ownership (public, private-for-profit and nonprofit) and three categories of hospital size,
nine combinations can be considered. The results derived from the estimation of Model 3
are displayed in table 5. Results derived from the estimation of Model 1 are given in table
6 in the appendix: they lead to identical conclusions as concerns the impact of production
factors.
For large hospitals, the contrasts displayed in table 5, column (c) show that public
hospitals are less productive than private-for-profit hospitals: the gap is sizeable, equal to
- 33.7%. The contributions of production factors to this gap are detailed in table 5, with
the resultant given line (2). The principal negative effect comes from the number of beds
(- 38.1%), which is particularly high in the public sector (see the descriptive analysis in
section 4.3). The excessive number of support staff also has a strong negative influence on
public hospital productivity (- 9.1%). We have seen that the proportion of support staff is
particularly large in public hospitals (section 4.3). As shown by Clark and Milcent (2011),
political considerations in connection with the local unemployment rate might influence
employment in French public hospitals. In total (line (2)), the resultant of productivity
differences due to production factors causes a productivity gap of - 33.6% for public hos-
18Actually, the whole two-step estimation procedure is non linear, which causes a non zero residual in
the decompositions of table 5.
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pitals. Patient characteristics also have a negative impact on public hospital productivity
(- 11.1%), as do production characteristics. The latter explains a 29% gap with respect
to private-for-profit hospitals, of which 25.7% are due to the proportion of surgical stays:
the specialization of private-for-profit hospitals in surgical stays explains their higher pro-
ductivity. Conversely, the positive impact of teaching hospitals, hightech establishments
which are exclusively public, and the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, work in favor of
the productivity of public hospitals. The influence of unobserved heterogeneity is likely to
reflect the impact of omitted variables such as the number of doctors, or the existence of
economies of scale or scope. Finally, as stated above, differences in productive effi ciency
work in favour of public hospitals (column (c), line (7)). However, the impact on the
productivity gap of differences in effi ciency is very limited: + 0.7% only.
Private nonprofit hospitals are not very common in France, unlike the USA. Some
people try to promote this type of ownership in France, arguing that it combines flexibility
in human resources management, as in the private sector, with an objective function that is
compatible with mandates in connection with the public interest (Silber, 2005). Actually,
the relative performance of large private nonprofit hospitals with respect to for profit
hospitals is about the same as the relative performance of large public hospitals (table 5).
The productivity gap is smaller, though still sizeable (- 21.0%, see column (i)).We find that
the same factors explain the lower productivity of large nonprofit hospitals: the number
of beds, support staff in excess, as well as production composition, characterized by a low
proportion of surgical stays. One noticeable result is that patient composition tends to
improve productivity of large nonprofit hospitals (+ 2.2%, line (3), column (i)), contrary
to what we find for public hospitals. To sum up, large nonprofit hospitals appear quite
similar to large public hospitals, except that they benefit from an advantageous patient
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composition. Since they are not allowed to select patients, other mechanisms must be
at work. One explanation could lie in specific links between nonprofit hospitals and some
complementary health insurance compagnies, resulting in preferential assignment of their
enrollees to nonprofit hospitals. Indeed, optional complementary insurance is subscribed
to by higher proportion by high income individuals than low income individuals.
These results are confirmed by an examination of medium size hospitals. In this cate-
gory, private nonprofit and for profit hospitals are quite numerous: 40 nonprofit and 234
for profit hospitals are observed, giving robustness to the conclusions drawn above.
The only noticeable difference is that the number of beds in public and nonprofit hospi-
tals has a lower negative impact: the productivity loss is equal to about 12% (line "beds",
columns (b) and (h)).
The performance of small public hospitals is very poor, compared to small private-for-
profit hospitals: the productivity gap amouts to - 54.5%! This gap is explained by patient
composition (- 25.8%), production characteristics (- 45.7%) and high ineffi ciency (- 34.1%)
(table 5, column (a)).
7 Conclusion
The hospital payment reform of 2004 has introduced yardstick competition to provide
incentives for effi ciency in care delivery. Convergence of payments was supposed to establish
competition mechanisms between public (or nonprofit) and for profit hospitals, in order
to reduce their cost differences. The latter might derive from productivity gaps or, for
a given level of productivity, from differences in input prices. They can also derive from
allocative ineffi ciency when hospitals do not adjust the input proportion in connection to
their relative prices. If hospitals are cost effi cient, differences in productivity might result
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from input price difference between sectors (In France nurses’wages are higher in private
than in public hospitals, Aude and Raynaud, 2009). More simply, productivity differences
can stem from productive ineffi ciency, when actual production is below the production
frontier.
Focusing on hospital productivity instead of hospital costs amounts to examining only
one cause of cost differences between public and private hospitals. However, this approach
has two advantages: (i) it makes possible the use of a performance indicator, which is
reliable and comparable between private and public hospitals; (ii) contrary to studies on
costs, that restrict the analysis to a rather limited hospital subsample, it enables us to use
comprehensive administrative data, that represent about 90% of admissions for acute care
in France.
We show that the appraisal of productive effi ciency depends closely on the production
frontier specification. With a classical production function linking inputs to output, the
estimated effi ciency rates of public hospitals are lower than those of private nonprofit
hospitals, which are themselves lower than the effi ciency rates of private-for-profit hospitals.
This ranking in effi ciency is observed whatever the size of the establishments. But this
ranking is reversed when the frontier specification includes hospital patient and production
characteristics. Except for small establishments, public hospitals then appear to be more
effi cient than private-for-profit hospitals. Private nonprofit hospitals are also more effi cient
than for profit hospitals, whatever their size. This result concerning the inversion of the
ranking of effi ciency rates is particularly robust: it is obtained for several specifications of
the production function, whether or not teaching hospitals are included, whether or not
physicians are included in the regressors, etc.
These results should be interpreted in the light of the mandates and rules that regulate
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the activity of public hospitals. It is striking that the ranking in effi ciency is reversed when
patient and production composition is included in the analysis. Indeed, the structure of
activity and patient composition are exogenously given for public hospitals, because they
have to provide care in relation to needs and are not allowed to select patients.
Our estimates make it possible to assess the components of the productivity differences
by type of hospital ownership. The lower productivity of public hospitals is mainly explained
by an excessive number of beds, an excessive number of support staff, as well as patient
and production composition (in particular, the small proportion of surgical stays). It is
not explained by lower effi ciency.19
The fact that hospital productivity is influenced by patient and production composition
is problematic. As a result, the payment reform is likely to encourage public hospitals to
manipulate their patient composition and modify the structure of their supply for care.
On the basis of our estimates, they should for instance admit less women aged 80 and
increase the proportion of surgical stays. In principle, a payment scheme based on yardstick
competititon is an instrument to improve productive effi ciency. It is not supposed to
influence allocative effi ciency. The fee schedule is supposed to reflect costs associated to
effi cient activity. Tariffs are not supposed to be prices that would reflect the social value,
or desirability of a stay in a given DRG. Our results suggest that the production function
is such that production composition affects productivity. In this context, a system based
on a prospective payment per stay might be harmful to allocative effi ciency.
19Except for small hospitals.
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Table 1: Basic feature of the data  
Size Ownership 
Number of 
Hospitals 
Number of 
beds per 
hospital 
Anual number 
of stays per 
hospital 
Share % in total 
production*  
[in total stays]  
Average LOS* 
[average median 
LOS] 
 
Number 
of stays 
per bed 
Proportion of 
surgical stays 
% 
Annual 
production** 
per bed  
Small 
Public 282 45 1,794 
2.7 
[3.0] 
9.3 
[7.1] 
33 7.9 43,225 
 
NP 
 
72 64 2,499 
1.3 
[1.1] 
6.9 
[4.6] 
37 20.9 62,405 
FP 541 58 2,986 
11.1 
[11.7] 
3.9 
[2.3] 
54 47.2 73,785 
Medium 
Public 117 151 7,129 
6.0 
[6.9] 
5.4 
[3.5] 
48 20.5 60,222 
 
NP 
 
40 153 6,811 
2.5 
[2.0] 
4.5 
[2.5] 
45 29.8 81,914 
FP 234 118 6,823 
14.3 
[14.1] 
3.5 
[1.8] 
60 50.4 87,201 
Large 
Public 243 566 26,865 
53.4 
[53.0] 
5.3 
[2.7] 
49 18.0 67,390 
 
NP 
 
14 339 15,303 
1.6 
[1.4] 
4.7 
[2.4] 
47 24.8 78,604 
FP 61 201 12,381 
7.3 
[6.7] 
3.8 
[2.1] 
63 44.6 97,242 
Total  
1,604 
(7,731 obs) 
169 8,334 
100.0 
[100.0] 
5.1 
[3.1] 
50 33.5  70,517 
1,604 hospitals 1998-2003, 7,731 observations in the hospital-year dimension 
Small hospitals: less than 5,000 discharges per year; Large hospitals: more than 10,000 discharges per year. 
*
 LOS is measured in days: we provide the mean of the LOS averaged at the hospital level, and the mean of the LOS median, computed at the hospital level.  
**
 The production is measured by the number of ISA points (in thousand)
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Table 2 Organization of hospital staff 
Size Ownership 
Number 
of beds 
Total 
persons 
/bed 
Doctors# / 
bed 
Nurses/bed 
Nursing 
auxiliairy 
staff/bed 
Adm.staff/
bed 
Support 
staff/bed 
Small 
Public 45
***
 7.62
***
 0.24
***
  1.63
***
 3.84
***
 0.68
***
 1.23
***
 
 
NP 
 
64
***
 3.56 
0.20
*** 
[0.15 ;0.24 ]
 
1.10 1.12 0.53
***
 0.62 
FP 58
***
 1.76
***
 
0.26
*** 
[0.13 ;0.36 ]
 
0.51
***
 0.59
***
 0.25
***
 0.14
***
 
Medium 
Public 151
***
 3.66 0.29
**
 1.08
**
 1.33
***
 0.38 0.57
***
 
 
NP 
 
153
***
 2.62
***
 
0.17
*** 
[0.15 ;0.19 ]
 
0.83
***
 0.71
***
 0.44
**
 0.47
***
 
FP 118
***
 1.67
***
 
0.22
*** 
[0.13 ;0.29 ]
 
0.54
***
 0.58
***
 0.21
***
 0.12
***
 
Large 
Public 566
(ref)
 3.65
(ref)
 0.32
(ref)
 1.16
(ref)
 1.15
(ref)
 0.39 
(ref)
 0.63 
(ref)
 
 
NP 
 
339
***
 2.86
**
 
0.13
*** 
[0.11 ; 0.14]
 
0.95
**
 0.77
*
 0.47
**
 0.55 
FP 201
***
 1.91
***
 
0.27
*** 
[0.17 ;0.35 ]
 
0.63
***
 0.65
***
 0.21
***
 0.14
***
 
Total  169 3.14 0.26 0.87 1.23 0.35 0.44 
1,604 hospitals 1998-2003, 7,731 observations in the hospital-year dimension 
The difference with the average level in large public hospitals is significant 1% (
***
),5% (
**
),10% (
*
) 
# 
Doctors are observed on a sub sample of 1,169 hospitals only (5,798 observations on 1998-2003). For private 
hospitals (for profit and non profit) part-time doctors are supposed to work half time (coefficient 0.5). Between 
brackets is given the range obtained with two other hypotheses: coefficients 0.1 and 0.8. 
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Table 3: Estimation results, first step 
Dependent variable: Log (production per bed) 
  Model 1 Model  3 
Log (bed) -0,3318*** -0,4863*** 
Log (nurs/ bed) 0,2780*** 0,1969*** 
Log (nurs_aux/bed) 0,0437 0,1060* 
Log (adm staff/bed) 0,4562*** 0,4092*** 
Log (support staff/bed) -0,2973*** -0,2562*** 
% women 19-40  
 
0,2445 
% men 19-40  
 
0,9419** 
% women 41-50  
 
0,0339 
% men 41-50 = ref. 
 
- 
% women 51-60  
 
-0,1185 
% men 51-60  
 
0,3850 
% women 61-70  
 
0,7537** 
% men 61-70  
 
0,3720 
% women 71-80  
 
0,4213 
% men 71-80  
 
-0,0914 
% women 81-90  
 
-0,6642** 
% men 81-90  
 
-0,2187 
% women 91 + 
 
-0,0420 
% men  91 + 
 
-0,7965 
% admissions severity 1= ref. 
 
- 
% admissions severity 2 
 
0,8239*** 
% admissions severity 3 
 
1,6051*** 
 
Admission  
 another hospital or care unit= ref. 
 
- 
                                home 
 
-0,1240** 
Discharge 
                                another care unit = ref. 
 
- 
                               home 
 
-0,0604 
                              other hospital 
 
-0,0667 
                            death 
 
-1,0268*** 
% stays in CMD 1 
 
-0,1443 
% stays in CMD 2 
 
-0,1497 
% stays in CMD 3 
 
-0,5791** 
% stays in CMD 4 
 
0,7489*** 
% stays in CMD 5 
 
0,8068*** 
% stays in CMD 6 
 
1,6901*** 
% stays in CMD 8 
 
0,4857*** 
% stays in CMD 14 
 
2,0726*** 
% stays in CMD 23 
 
0,3671** 
% stays shorter than 24h) 
 
0,7965*** 
% stays with surgery 
 
0,9670*** 
Specialisation Index  
 
0,1909*** 
Specialisation Intensity 
 
-0,6586*** 
 R2 0,99 0,99 
1,604 hospitals 1998-2003, 7,731 observations. Specifications include year dummies and hospital fixed effects. 
 *: significant (10 %), **: significant (5 %), ***: significant (1 %).  
MDC 1: nervous system, MDC 2: Eye, MDC 3: Ear, Nose, Mouth And Throat, MDC 4: Respiratory System, 
MDC 5: Circulatory System, MDC 6: Digestive System, MDC 8: Musculoskeletal System And Connective 
Tissue, MDC 14: Pregnancy, Childbirth And Puerperium, MDC 23: Factors Influencing Health Status. 
Specialization index= 1 if the highest proportion of stays in a given MDC is greater than 33 %, intensity is equal 
to the value of the highest proportion of stays in a given MDC, if Specialization index= 1 (otherwise it is equal to 
0). 
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Table 4a  
Estimation, second step: SCF model to identify inefficiency 
Estimation of the SCF 
model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
asymmetry parameter 
  uv  
3.471 2.763 1.222 
p-value for the LR test for 
σu = 0 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficient for Teaching 0.649*** 0.694*** 1.027*** 
 
Table 4b  
Second step: median of estimated hospital efficiency rates effih 
Size Ownership Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Small 
Public 17.2 30.2 48.2 
NP 43.6 50.1 64.4 
FP 57.9 57.0 62.9 
Medium 
Public 64.2 74.9 78.6 
NP 79.4 75.7 78.6 
FP 80.8 80.5 76.3 
Large 
Public 82.4 85.9 84.5 
NP 87.6 85.5 83.8 
FP 88.7 87.4 81.7 
1604 hospitals, 7,731 observations in the hospital-year dimension, period 1998-2003 
The efficiency rate, is defined by: effih =exp(-uh)=Qh/Q
max
h   
Lecture: effi=82.4 for large public hospitals means that, given the estimated  
production function, large public hospitals produce only 82.4 % of their  
production capacity. 
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Graph 4 
Efficiency rate distributions: effih estimated with Model 1 
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Graph 5 
Efficiency rate distributions: effih estimated with Model 3 
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Table 5: Decomposition of average productivity differences, % (with model 3) 
 Small 
Public – FP 
(a) 
Medium 
Public – FP 
(b) 
Large 
Public – FP 
(c) 
Small 
Public – NP 
(d) 
Medium 
Public – NP 
(e) 
Large 
Public - NP  
(f) 
Small 
NP – FP 
(g) 
Medium 
NP – FP 
(h) 
Large 
NP – FP 
(i) 
Average diff in 
productivity (to 
be explained) 
(1) 
-54.5 - 33.6 - 33.7 - 37.2 - 26.2 - 12.7 - 17.3 - 7.4 - 21.0 
Due to :           
Beds + 23.9 - 12.4 - 38.1 + 24.4 + 0.5 - 16.3 - 0.5 - 12.9 - 21.8 
nurses  9.3 5.5 + 5.5 4.1 2.2 2,1 5.2 3.3 3.4 
Nursing aux staff 9.9 4.0 + 2.8 7.5 3.3 2,1 2.4 0.8 0.7 
administrative staff 10.6 5.1 + 5.4 3.4 -1.6 -2,0 7.2 6.7 7.4 
Support staff -15.1 - 8.4 - 9.1 - 7.7 - 2.0 - 1.8 - 7.4 - 6.4 - 7.3 
Total diff due 
to production 
factors (2) 
+ 38.6 - 6.2 - 33.6 + 31.6 + 2.3 - 16.1 + 6.9 - 8.5 - 17.5 
Total diff due 
to patient 
characteristics 
(3) 
- 25.8 - 14.1 - 11.1 - 19.9 - 19.1 - 13.3 - 6.0 + 5.0 + 2.2 
Total diff due 
to production 
characteristics 
(4) 
(of which % of 
surgical stays)  
- 45.7 
(- 38.0) 
- 27.5 
(- 29.0) 
- 29.0 
(-25.7) 
- 20.5 
(- 12.6) 
- 9.4 
(- 9.0) 
- 8.9 
(- 6.5) 
- 25.2 
(- 25.4) 
- 18.1 
(- 20.0) 
- 20.1 
(- 19.1) 
Teaching 
hospital (5) 
+ 4.4 + 2.6 23.7 + 4.4 + 2.6 23.7 - - - 
Unobservable 
heterogeneity 
(6) 
- 4.7 + 8.2 14.9 - 9.3 - 2.2 + 3.9 + 4.6 + 10.4 + 10.9 
Inefficiency (7) 
- 34.1 + 2.9 0.7 - 32.9 - 1.9 - 1.0 - 1.2 + 4.8 + 1.7 
Residual* (8) 13.0 0.6 0.7 9.4 1.5 - 1.1 3.6 - 0.9 1.9 
1,604 hospitals 1998-2003, 7,731 observations. One has : (g) = (a)-(d) ; (h) = (b)- (e); (i) = (c) – (f).  
* A residual appears because the two-step estimation procedure is non linear. 
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Appendix 
Table 6: Decomposition of average productivity differences, % (with model 1) 
 Small 
Public – FP 
(a) 
Medium 
Public – FP 
(b) 
Large 
Public – FP 
(c) 
Small 
Public – NP 
(d) 
Medium 
Public – NP 
(e) 
Large 
Public - NP  
(f) 
Small 
NP – FP 
(g) 
Medium 
NP – FP 
(h) 
Large 
NP – FP 
(i) 
Average diff in 
productivity (to 
be explained) 
(1) 
-54.5 - 33.6 - 33.7 - 37.2 - 26.2 - 12.7 - 17.3 - 7.4 - 21.0 
Due to :           
Beds + 16.3 - 8.5 - 26.0 + 16.6 + 0.3 - 11.1 - 0.3 - 8.8 - 14.9 
nurses  +13.1 + 7.7 + 7.7 + 5.8 + 3.1 + 2.9 + 7.3 + 4.7 + 4.8 
Nursing aux staff + 4.1 + 1.7 + 1.1 + 3.1 + 1.3 + 0.8 + 1.0 + 0.3 + 0.3 
administrative staff + 11.8 + 5.7 + 6.0 + 3.8 - 1.7 - 2.3 + 8.0 + 7.4 + 8.3 
Support staff - 17.5 -9.8 - 10.6 - 9.0 - 2.4 - 2.1 - 8.5 - 7.4 - 8.5 
Total diff due 
to production 
factors (2) 
+ 27.8 - 3.2 - 21.7 + 20.3 + 0.6 - 11.8 + 7.5 - 3.8 - 9.9 
Teaching 
hospital (5) 
+ 2.8 + 1.7 + 15.0 + 2.8 + 1.7 + 15.0 0 0 0 
Unobservable 
heterogeneity 
(6) 
- 3.2 - 10.5 - 23.6 - 3.1 - 10.6 - 16.1 - 0.2 + 0.1 - 7.5 
Inefficiency (7) - 99.9 - 22.6 - 12.3 - 72.8 - 20.6 - 5.1 - 27.1 - 2.0 - 7.3 
Residual* (8) + 18.2 + 1.0 + 9.0 +15.6 + 2.7 + 5.3 + 2.6 - 1.7 + 3.7 
1,604 hospitals 1998-2003, 7,731 observations. One has : (g) = (a)-(d) ; (h) = (b)- (e); (i) = (c) – (f). 
* A residual appears because the two-step estimation procedure is non linear. 
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Table 7: Estimation results, first step 
Robustness: estimation without teaching hospitals 
Dependent variable: Log (production per bed) 
  Model 1 Model  3 
Log (bed) -0,3287*** -0,4852*** 
Log (nurs/ bed) 0,2937*** 0,2108*** 
Log (nurs_aux/bed) 0,0328 0,0976* 
Log (adm staff/bed) 0,4707*** 0,4187*** 
Log (support staff/bed) -0,3043*** -0,2604*** 
% women 19-40  
 
0,2542 
% men 19-40  
 
0,9248** 
% women 41-50  
 
0,0309 
% men 41-50 = ref. 
 
- 
% women 51-60  
 
-0,0615 
% men 51-60  
 
0,3755 
% women 61-70  
 
0,7794** 
% men 61-70  
 
0,3745 
% women 71-80  
 
0,4453 
% men 71-80  
 
-0,1212 
% women 81-90  
 
-0,7391*** 
% men 81-90  
 
-0,0918 
% women 91 + 
 
-0,0136 
% men  91 + 
 
-0,8356 
% admissions severity 1= ref. 
 
- 
% admissions severity 2 
 
0,8225*** 
% admissions severity 3 
 
1,6106*** 
 
Admission  
 another hospital or care unit= ref. 
 
- 
                                home 
 
-0,1231** 
Discharge 
                                another care unit = ref. 
 
 
- 
                               home 
 
-0,0460 
                              other hospital 
 
-0,0725 
                            death 
 
-1,0490*** 
% stays in CMD 1 
 
-0,1739 
% stays in CMD 2 
 
-0,1442 
% stays in CMD 3 
 
-0,5621** 
% stays in CMD 4 
 
0,7546*** 
% stays in CMD 5 
 
0,8142*** 
% stays in CMD 6 
 
1,6991*** 
% stays in CMD 8 
 
0,4825** 
% stays in CMD 14 
 
2,0743*** 
% stays in CMD 23 
 
0,3651** 
% stays shorter than 24h) 
 
0,7983*** 
% stays with surgery 
 
0,9628*** 
Specialisation Index  
 
0,1887** 
Specialisation Intensity 
 
-0,6530*** 
 R2 0,99 0,99 
1,533 hospitals 1998-2003, 7,479 observations. Specifications include year dummies and hospital fixed effects. 
 *: significant (10 %), **: significant (5 %), ***: significant (1 %).  
MDC 1: nervous system, MDC 2: Eye, MDC 3: Ear, Nose, Mouth And Throat, MDC 4: Respiratory System, 
MDC 5: Circulatory System, MDC 6: Digestive System, MDC 8: Musculoskeletal System And Connective 
Tissue, MDC 14: Pregnancy, Childbirth And Puerperium, MDC 23: Factors Influencing Health Status. 
Specialization index= 1 if the highest proportion of stays in a given MDC is greater than 33 %, intensity is equal 
to the value of the highest proportion of stays in a given MDC, if Specialization index= 1 (otherwise it is equal to 
0). 
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Checking for robustness: estimation without teaching hospitals 
Table 8a  
Estimation, second step: SCF model to identify inefficiency 
Estimation of the SCF 
model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
asymmetry parameter 
  uv  
3.434 2.725 1.127 
p-value for the LR test for 
σu = 0 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 8b  
Second step: median of estimated hospital efficiency rates effih 
Size Ownership Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Small 
Public 18.1 35.5 54.2 
NP 43.9 50.7 66.0 
FP 58.3 57.2 64.5 
Medium 
Public 64.9 75.4 79.2 
NP 79.5 75.8 79.0 
FP 81.0 80.5 77.0 
Large 
Public 83.7 87.6 85.5 
NP 87.6 85.6 84.1 
FP 88.8 87.6 82.0 
No teaching hospital: 1533 hospitals, 7479 observations in the hospital-year dimension, 
 period 1998-2003 
The efficiency rate, is defined by: effih =exp(-uh)=Qh/Q
max
h 
Lecture: effi=83.7 for large public hospitals : they produce only 83.7 % of their  production capacity. 
